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DISABILITY STIGMA AND INTRACLASS
DISCRIMINATION
Jeannette Cox*
ABSTRACT
By dramatically enlarging the Americans with Disabilities Act’s
(ADA) protected class, the recent amendments to the ADA increase the
opportunities for employers to replace one member of the ADA’s
protected class with another. Although disparities in the social stigma
associated with different disabilities suggests that such employment
decisions are not automatically free from disability-based animus, many
courts historically regarded such decisions as immune from ADA
scrutiny. They held that the ADA only prohibited discrimination
between persons inside and outside the ADA’s protected class. Today,
this “no intraclass claims” approach persists in a modified form: Some
courts limit intraclass claims to situations in which employers disfavor
persons with more biologically severe disabilities vis-à-vis those with
less biologically severe disabilities. Although this approach benefits
individuals with more biologically severe disabilities, it compounds the
disadvantage experienced by persons whose disabilities carry the most
significant social stigma, a burden that does not directly correlate with
the biological severity of a person’s disability. This Article argues that
just as courts’ traditional refusal to permit intraclass disability
discrimination claims inappropriately obscured the negative social
responses to disabilities the ADA was designed to address, courts’
current emphasis on the biological severity of disabilities departs from
the ADA’s core purpose: remedying the stigma and stereotypical
assumptions experienced by individuals with disabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
By dramatically enlarging the Americans with Disabilities Act’s
(ADA)1 protected class, the recent amendments to the ADA increase the
opportunities for employers to replace one member of the ADA’s
protected class with another. Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA),2 the ADA’s protected class encompassed an estimated
13.5 million individuals, or approximately 4% of the U.S. population.3
Today, by contrast, the ADA’s protected class includes at least 43
million persons, or 14% of the U.S. population, though the actual
number is likely much higher.4 The previously excluded individuals
include persons with mild forms of previously included disabilities as
well as individuals whose relatively severe disabilities can be
ameliorated with medication.5 Accordingly, the large umbrella of the
newly amended ADA’s protected class includes individuals with
disabilities as diverse as diabetes, depression, back pain, deafness,
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
2. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
3. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 14 (2007) (arguing that prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the ADA left “fewer than 13.5 million Americans protected by the
ADA—most of whom are unlikely to be able to take advantage of the statute’s employment
protections”).
4. Adopted in 1990, the ADA’s original text noted that 43 million Americans have some
form of a disability, and that this number will likely increase over time. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1). The ADAAA removed this provision in order to emphasize that courts should
regard the 43 million estimate as a floor, not a ceiling, on the number of persons in the ADA’s
protected class. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3.
5. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § (2)(b)(6) (“The purposes of this act are . . . to
express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise
that portion of its current regulations that defines the term ‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly
restricted’ to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act.”); id.
§ 2(b)(2) (“The purposes of this Act are . . . to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with
reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures . . . .”).
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schizophrenia, monocular vision, and missing limbs. It also includes
people who do not actually have a disability but whom a defendantemployer perceives to have a disability.6
The social barriers experienced by the members of the ADA’s
protected class vary widely. For example, while a missing limb may
appear to be a more biologically severe disability than depression, a
person with depression may experience greater social and vocational
obstacles in the modern workplace, which often emphasizes a positive
outlook.7 Similarly, while Asperger’s syndrome, a relatively mild
neurological condition related to autism, may appear less biologically
severe than paraplegia, an individual with Asperger’s syndrome may
experience more significant socially imposed barriers in many
employment sectors. Thanks to the universal design movement, which
has improved architectural accessibility for persons with physical
disabilities, many work environments pose greater obstacles to persons
who have difficulty navigating complex social structures than to persons
with mobility limitations. In addition, corporate incentives to achieve
visible diversity in the workforce may motivate employers to prefer
persons with mobility limitations and other physically obvious
disabilities. Comparatively, employers have little incentive to hire
persons with less obvious disabilities whose disability-related traits are
more likely to elicit negative responses from fellow employees.8
The ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability,
would appear to be the natural vehicle to address employment decisions
that single out persons with uniquely stigmatized disabilities for
negative treatment. Nonetheless, plaintiffs with the most stigmatized
disabilities face difficulty using the ADA to challenge negative
treatment they experience.9 In part, this difficulty arises from the
ADA’s built-in limitations on employers’ obligations to reshape the
6. Id. § 4(a)(3)(A).
7. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271,
272 (2000) (“For many years, research has also consistently shown that people with psychiatric
disabilities are subject to more severe employment discrimination than people with other kinds
of disabilities.”) (citing Marjorie Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, in
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 1997, at 37, 37–52; Edward H. Yelin & Miriam G.
Cisternas, Employment Patterns Among Persons with and Without Mental Conditions, in
MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 25, 35 (Richard J. Bonnie & John
Monahan eds., 1997) [hereinafter MENTAL DISORDER]; Sue E. Estroff et al., “No Other Way to
Go”: Pathways to Disability Income Application Among Persons with Severe, Persistent Mental
Illness, in MENTAL DISORDER 55, 60).
8. Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND.
L.J. 187 (2009).
9. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 273 (“[A]n examination of both reported cases and
research supports the conclusion that people with psychiatric disabilities have received minimal
benefit from the ADA’s protections against employment discrimination.”).
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workplace to include individuals with disabilities—i.e., the “reasonable
accommodation” and “undue hardship” provisions.10 Both of these
provisions allow employers to use cost concerns to justify their refusal
to make disability-related adjustments to the workplace.11 However,
these limitations on employers’ accommodationary responsibilities
cannot explain all the difficulties persons with the most stigmatized
disabilities face in ADA litigation. These persons—many of whom have
mental and psychological disabilities—often do not need expensive
modifications to the employer’s physical facilities; instead, these
workers more often simply require supervisors and co-workers to look
past the stigma associated with their disability.12
The more direct obstacle to individuals with the most stigmatized
disabilities is courts’ reluctance to embrace intraclass disability
discrimination claims.13 Although rarely acknowledged in the
employment discrimination literature, many courts initially confronted
with the ADA, and § 504, the statutory precursor to the ADA, refused to
characterize
disability-motivated
termination
decisions
as
discriminatory unless the employer replaced the terminated employee
with a nondisabled person.14 These courts regarded the identification of
a nondisabled comparator as not merely helpful, but essential to
establishing a disability discrimination claim. Accordingly, an employer
could often avoid liability for a disability-motivated termination
decision by replacing the terminated employee with another member of
the ADA’s protected class. Today, although many courts have wholly or
partially abandoned the requirement that ADA plaintiffs identify a
comparator outside the ADA’s protected class, many courts continue to
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)–(10) (2006).
11. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
12. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 274 (“[I]n the traditional form of discrimination
claim, . . . the employee is not asking for accommodations but simply to be treated the same as
everyone else. Many people with psychiatric disabilities, and most whose claims are based on
perceived psychiatric disabilities, fall into this category.”). The more formidable obstacle to
discrimination claims by persons with the most stigmatized disabilities—the restricted scope of
the ADA’s protected class—was removed by ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Prior to the amendments, courts barred many persons with
mental and psychological disabilities from the ADA’s protected class because their medications
reduced the “substantial limitation” they would otherwise experience. The amendments,
however, rejected this overly literal interpretation of the ADA’s text and thus brought into the
ADA’s protected class many persons with pharmacologically treatable, but nonetheless
stigmatized, conditions such as bipolar disorder, depression, and epilepsy. Id.
13. Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 194 (2009) (noting that the general phenomenon of courts
assessing the presence or absence of a comparator in discrimination cases, “though scarcely
invisible, has received little attention”).
14. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits recipients of federal funds
from discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
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limit intraclass disability discrimination claims by requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate that their disabilities are more biologically severe than the
disabilities of persons who received more favorable treatment.
To date, disability scholars have not focused on problem of courts
limiting intraclass claims, perhaps due to the relatively limited number
of intraclass discrimination claims.15 The 2008 amendments’ expansion
of the ADA’s protected class, however, makes intraclass disability
discrimination claims more salient. By bringing a broader range of
individuals into the ADA’s protected class—including a large number
of persons whose disabilities are less biologically severe—the
amendments increase opportunities for employers to choose amongst
members of the ADA’s protected class.16 Similarly, the amendments’
expansion of the number of persons able to sue under the ADA will
increase the number of employees and prospective employees who will
consider filing intraclass claims.
The manner in which courts deal with the oncoming wave of
intraclass disability discrimination claims will reveal a great deal about
the extent to which courts have abandoned the welfare model of
disability policy in favor of the civil rights model that aligns the ADA
with traditional civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The welfare model of disability policy gives priority to
persons with biologically severe disabilities, based on the assumption
that disability policy should compensate for biological limitations. It
also emphasizes maximizing aggregate benefits to “the disabled” as a
class even when doing so disadvantages persons with the most
stigmatized disabilities.
A civil rights model, by contrast, focuses on the socially-imposed
obstacles faced by people with disabilities and attempts to remove those
obstacles. It emphasizes an individual’s right to be free from disabilitybased animus, unnecessary paternalism, and harmful stereotypes.17
15. The notable exception is Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly
Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 859−61 (2002),
(collecting cases). Cf. Cox, supra note 8, at 214–17 (raising the issue briefly).
16. Although the ADAAA codifies judicial conclusions that the ADA does not permit
“reverse discrimination” suits by persons who claim that they were “subject to discrimination
because of [their] lack of disability,” the ADAAA says nothing about whether persons who fall
within the ADA’s protected class can challenge employers’ decisions to disadvantage them
because of their relatively lesser disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, § 6(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill
prohibits reverse discrimination claims by disallowing claims based on the lack of
disability. . . .”).
17. See Cox, supra note 8, at 190–93 (describing the competing civil rights and welfare
models of disability policy that have defined the debate surrounding the interpretation of the
ADA).
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The civil rights model suggests that the ADA’s purpose is not to
provide preferential treatment to individuals with the most biologically
severe disabilities, but is instead to challenge disability animus and to
remove socially imposed barriers to persons with disabilities. While a
welfare model—embodied in legislation such as the Social Security
Disability program—might reasonably prioritize benefit allocations to
individuals whose disabilities are the most biologically severe, the ADA
should not enshrine a similar preference for biological severity.
Litigation under the ADA should focus on disability animus and
stereotypes rather than the biological severity of various disabilities.
Accordingly, the ADA should account for the possibility that an
employer who refuses to hire an individual with Asperger’s syndrome
in favor of a less qualified wheelchair user may have engaged in
disability discrimination even though the wheelchair user possesses a
more biologically severe disability. Just as the historical bar on
intraclass disability discrimination claims obscured the negative social
responses to disability that the civil rights model emphasizes, courts’
current focus on the biological severity of disabilities also obscures
negative social responses to disabilities.
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I identifies the primary
rationale for courts’ initial reluctance to permit intraclass claims: the
ADA’s limited protected class. Courts emphasized that, unlike Title
VII, which prohibits race and sex discrimination against every
employee of a covered employer, regardless of the employee’s race or
sex, the ADA prohibits disability discrimination only against the
members of the ADA’s protected class. Focusing on the language that
then defined the ADA’s protected class—individuals who possess “a
substantial limitation upon one or more of [their] major life
activities”—courts concluded that the ADA prohibited discrimination
only between persons who fell within that definition and those that fell
without it. In 1996, however, the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the other federal statute
with a limited protected class, deflated this “limited protected class”
rationale for restricting intraclass claims under the ADA. With the
“limited protected class” rationale now discredited, Part II argues that
courts’ continued resistance to intraclass disability discrimination
claims stems from a welfare model justification: the belief that the ADA
should maximize aggregate benefits to the ADA’s protected class as a
whole even when it disadvantages persons with the most stigmatized
disabilities. Part II also argues that, although courts may regard the
ADA as encompassing a continuum of individuals whose disabilities
range from more to less biologically severe, courts should not conclude
that the ADA prohibits intraclass discrimination only in situations
where employers disfavor persons with disabilities that are more
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biologically severe. The ADA’s text indicates that the ADA is not
solely concerned with the biological severity of individuals’ disabilities;
instead, the statute is targeted to address “restrictions and limitations,”
“unequal treatment,” and “stereotypic assumptions,”18 or, in other
words, socially imposed difficulties to persons with disabilities.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “LIMITED PROTECTED CLASS BARRIER” TO
INTRACLASS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Courts’ Traditional Refusal to Allow Intraclass Claims
In the first two decades of disability discrimination litigation, many
courts held that the ADA categorically barred intraclass claims. These
courts regarded the identification of a nondisabled comparator as not
merely helpful, but essential, to establish a disability discrimination
claim. They broadly concluded that the ADA only prohibits policies and
practices that disadvantage “the disabled” vis-à-vis “the nondisabled.”19
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).
19. Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting “the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act permit preferential treatment between disabilities”); Parker v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act,
prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled.”); Brennen v. Comptroller
of N.Y., No. 95-7559, 1996 WL 19057, at * 1 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (“To state a claim under
the ADA, plaintiffs must allege that defendants treated them differently from non-disabled
employees, or that defendants’ practices have a disparate impact upon disabled employees
relative to non-disabled employees. . . . At bottom . . . plaintiffs are claiming that the defendants
are discriminating among disabled persons. Like the Rehabilitation Act, however, whose case
law we may look to for guidance . . . the ADA does not proscribe such conduct.”) (emphasis
added); Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Section 504
proscribes discrimination between the nonhandicapped and the ‘otherwise qualified’
handicapped.”); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[W]e have serious doubts
whether Congress intended § 504 to provide plaintiffs with a claim for discrimination vis-à-vis
other handicapped individuals . . . .”); Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 985 F. Supp.
635, 639 (D.S.C. 1997) (“[T]he ADA proscribes only discrimination between the disabled and
the non-disabled. The gravamen of Rogers’ claim, discrimination between individuals with
different disabilities, is not governed by the ADA.”); Rome v. MTA/N.Y. City Transit, No. 97CV-2945, 1997 WL 1048908, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997) (“In order to establish a claim of
discrimination under the ADA, plaintiffs must show that they have been treated differently than
similarly situated non-disabled persons. Merely distinguishing among disabilities does not
constitute discrimination under the ADA.”); Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp.
386, 391 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (“[T]he ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply only to discrimination
between or among disabled and non-disabled persons.”); Wolford v. Lewis, 860 F. Supp. 1123,
1134 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (stating that § 504 requires “only that disabled individuals receive the
same treatment as those who are not disabled”); People First of Tenn. v. Arlington
Developmental Ctr., 878 F. Supp. 97, 101 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (“Plaintiffs are claiming, inter
alia, that some Arlington residents are being excluded from community services, because of the
severity of their retardation or physical disabilities, but that other handicapped persons are
receiving such services. However, an action asserting that certain plaintiffs have been the victim
of discrimination vis-a-vis other handicapped people must fail because § 504 does not cover
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Reasoning that “[i]t is not a violation of [§ 504 or the ADA] to
differentiate among applicants [based on] attributes of
handicap, . . . severity of handicap, . . . or level of handicap,”20 these
courts repeatedly rejected intraclass discrimination claims, informing
plaintiffs that they “cannot use the ADA to complain about a disparity
in treatment among individuals with different disabilities.”21
Based on this determination, many lower courts concluded that
public and private entities that exclusively serve persons with
disabilities could never violate disability nondiscrimination mandates
because such agencies did not serve persons without disabilities.22 For
example, in a case involving a New York disability agency, the Second
Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s claims under § 504 and the ADA
were “beyond tenuous given [the agency]’s sole purpose in assisting the
disabled.”23 Accordingly, until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring,24 many state facilities that
institutionalized persons with disabilities evaded challenges to their
terms and conditions of confinement by emphasizing that the facility
only institutionalized persons with disabilities.25
Courts’ refusal to permit intraclass disability claims also
discrimination among similarly handicapped persons . . . . Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims under
the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are dismissed.”); Cramer v. Florida, 885 F. Supp.
1545, 1551 (Fla. 1995) (concluding that “the ADA applies only to discrimination against
disabled persons compared to non-disabled persons”).
20. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 859 F. Supp. 776, 782, (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated
on other grounds, 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2006).
21. Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd. 149 F.3d 453, 457−58 (6th Cir. 1998).
22. See, e.g., Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d
679, 697−99 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that “because Dr. Freilich has alleged only a difference in
the way oversight and quality assurance is provided among hospital patients (who are arguably
all disabled), she fails to make the showing, as the statutes require, that the treatment of the
dialysis patients involves any difference in treatment between the disabled and the nondisabled”).
23. Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
24. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
25. The courts’ pre-Olmstead understanding of the ADA and § 504 as prohibiting only
disparate treatment between persons within and without the statutes’ protected class
understandably provided state governments an incentive—directly contrary to the ADA’s
nonsegregation objective—to segregate disability service facilities and programs from service
agencies that served other populations. See, e.g., People First of Tenn. v. Arlington
Developmental Ctr., 878 F. Supp. 97, 101 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that
“some Arlington residents are being excluded from community services, because of the severity
of their retardation or physical disabilities, but that other handicapped persons are receiving such
services” with the explanation that “an action asserting that certain plaintiffs have been the
victim of discrimination vis-à-vis other handicapped people must fail because § 504 [and the
ADA] does not cover discrimination among similarly handicapped persons”).
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significantly limited the scope of disability discrimination litigation in
employment settings. Many courts concluded that to prove disability
discrimination in a termination case, a plaintiff must show that “he or
she was replaced by a non-disabled person,”26 a showing that employers
could easily foreclose by replacing the plaintiff with another member of
the ADA’s protected class.27 For example, the District Court of the
Eastern District of Michigan concluded that a plaintiff with a disability
had “failed to allege any discriminatory event” when her employer
offered her desired job to another person with a disability.28 Even
though the sole issue before the court was whether the plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts in her EEOC complaint to toll the applicable
statute of limitations, a lenient pleading standard, the court reasoned
that the plaintiff’s EEOC complaint could not satisfy this minimal
requirement because the “plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination
involves one handicapped person (the plaintiff) vis-à-vis another
handicapped person.”29 Similarly, the District Court of the Southern
26. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Hancock v.
Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if [the plaintiff] could somehow establish that
she was disabled under the ADA, her claim would still fail on the grounds that she cannot point
to a single similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more
favorably.”); Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]o
establish a prima facie case for discriminatory employment termination, the plaintiff must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . he was ultimately replaced by a person sufficiently
outside the protected class to create an inference of discrimination.”) (reasoning later rejected by
Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 356 (3d Cir. 1999)); Reiter v. Taylor Corp., No.
97 C 3861, 1998 WL 801796, *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1998) (“Because Reiter has not made the
most basic showing—that people whom NuArt continued to employ were not disabled—this
Court cannot find that those outside the protected class, whether similarly situated or not, were
treated more favorably than the protected employees. . . . [Accordingly,] Reiter’s prima facie
case fails . . . .”); Kalekiristos v. CTF Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 654 n.12 (D.D.C.
1997) (“[T]his Court, as many other trial courts have, shall include a fourth element to the prima
facie case for disability discrimination: that the plaintiff was replaced by a non-disabled
person.”); see id. at 664 (explaining that the plaintiff has “failed to prove that his replacement
fell outside the protected class. In fact, the plaintiff repeatedly states he does not know who
replaced him. . . . [T]he plaintiff also suggested the names [of] two people as his replacements,
but he made no assertions regarding these persons’ abilities or disabilities. Needless to say, the
plaintiff has failed to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case”).
27. See Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 395 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
(noting that the practice of barring intraclass claims under the ADA effectively allows
“employers to control whom the ADA protects”); cf. Howard v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 726 F.2d
1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984) (inquiring whether an African American plaintiff’s “replacement by
another black was a pretextual device specifically designed to disguise an act of
discrimination”).
28. Fowler v. Frank, 702 F. Supp. 143, 146 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
29. Id. at 146 (“[The] plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination involves one handicapped
person (the plaintiff) vis-à-vis another handicapped person . . . . [T]he Court cannot accept the
offer of [the plaintiff’s desired job] to another handicapped employee as a valid discriminatory
event, as contemplated under section 504. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to allege any
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District of Indiana dismissed an ADA claim because the plaintiff failed
to present sufficient evidence to establish that the individuals her
employer treated more favorably lacked disabilities.30 Although courts
in many circuits have since relaxed this categorical bar on intraclass
disability discrimination claims, the Seventh Circuit, as recently as
2008, opined that lower courts within its jurisdiction must dismiss ADA
claims in which the plaintiff “cannot point to a single similarly situated
employee outside the protected class who was treated more
favorably.”31
To justify limitations on intraclass claims, many courts cite Traynor
v. Turnage,32 but this case does not actually support this restrictive
reading of the ADA. In Traynor, the Supreme Court concluded that a
longstanding statute, which denied to veterans with “primary
alcoholism” a veterans’ disability benefit, was not repealed by
Congress’s enactment of § 504, the statutory predecessor to the ADA.33
The Traynor Court reasoned that the benefits statute, which dealt “with
a narrow, precise, and specific subject, [was] not submerged by [§ 504,
a] later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum, [because]
the later statute [did not] expressly contradict the original act.”34 In
explaining why § 504 did not expressly contradict the benefits statute,
discriminatory event.”).
30. Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. IP-99-0848-C-M/S, 2001 WL 396953, at *7
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2001).
31. Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008). Relatedly, a larger number of
courts continue to categorically conclude that the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate does not
apply to employer-provided long–term disability plans or health insurance plans, even though
the ADA’s text, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2006), provides that insurance plans may differentiate
amongst disabilities only if the differentiation is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
ADA. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 150 (2d. Cir. 2000) (holding
that the ADA bars intraclass disability discrimination challenges to insurance plans); Parker v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (opining, in a case challenging an
insurance plan, that “[t]he ADA simply does not mandate equality between individuals with
different disabilities [but instead] prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the nondisabled”); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
ADA permits long–term disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental
disabilities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99-384-P-C, 2000 WL 1186262, at *8 n.7 (D. Me.
Aug. 2, 2000) (holding that the ADA permits long–term disability plans to differentiate between
physical and mental disabilities).
32. 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
33. 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (1972). The applicable regulations, which excluded veterans
from a waiver of a 10-year time limit for the use of an educational benefit, defined “primary
alcoholism,” as alcoholism not directly caused by a psychiatric disorder. Venereal Disease,
Alcholism, and Drug Usage, 37 Fed. Reg. 20,335-20,336 (Sept. 29, 1972) (to be codified in 38
C.F.R. pt.3).
34. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 548 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 552 (“[I]t is by no
means clear that § 504 and the characterization of primary alcoholism as a willfully incurred
disability are in irreconcilable conflict.”).
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the Court noted that
Congress is entitled to establish priorities for the allocation
of the limited resources available for veterans’
benefits, . . . and thereby to conclude that veterans who
bear some responsibility for their disabilities have no
stronger claim to an extended eligibility period than do
able-bodied veterans. Those veterans are not, in the words
of § 504, denied benefits “solely by reason of [their]
handicap,” but because they engaged with some degree of
willfulness in the conduct that caused them to become
disabled.35
The Court further reasoned—in language that lower courts later
quoted—that “the ‘willful misconduct’ provision does not undermine
the central purpose of § 504, which is to assure that handicapped
individuals receive ‘evenhanded treatment’ in relation to
nonhandicapped individuals.”36
Although this language led many lower courts to reason that § 504’s
nondiscrimination mandate—as well as the ADA’s parallel mandate—
was limited to cases in which a plaintiff could demonstrate that she did
not receive “evenhanded treatment” in relation to nondisabled persons,
the exchange between the majority and dissenting Justices in Traynor
reveals that the Traynor majority did not in fact endorse a categorical
bar on intraclass disability discrimination claims. Instead, the exchange
suggests that the Traynor majority believed that some policies which
disadvantage persons with certain disabilities vis-à-vis persons with
other types of disabilities would violate § 504.37 Responding to the
dissenters’ argument that Congress lacked a substantial basis for
concluding that primary alcoholism is always “willfully acquired,” the
Traynor majority conceded that if the dissenters were correct—if there
was in fact no “substantial basis” for treating alcoholics less favorably
than persons with other disabilities—§ 504 would prohibit Congress
from singling out alcoholics for lesser treatment.38 In other words,
contrary to lower courts’ subsequent usage of the Traynor opinion, the
Traynor majority acknowledged that § 504 indeed prohibited disabilitybased discrimination amongst members of § 504’s protected class. The
majority explained:
It would arguably be inconsistent with § 504 for Congress
to distinguish between categories of disabled veterans
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 549−50 (citations omitted).
Id. at 548.
Id. at 550.
Id.
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according to generalized determinations that lack any
substantial basis. If primary alcoholism is not always
“willful,” as that term has been defined by Congress and
the Veterans’ Administration, some veterans denied
benefits may well be excluded solely on the basis of their
disability.39
Accordingly, the Traynor majority acknowledged that policies
disfavoring persons with certain disabilities vis-à-vis persons with other
types of disabilities would survive § 504 scrutiny only if the disparate
treatment had a “substantial basis.”40 In other words, treating persons
with specific disabilities less favorably than similarly situated persons
with other disabilities could violate § 504 (and also, presumably, the
subsequently enacted ADA).
Given that Traynor did not require lower courts to prohibit intraclass
disability discrimination claims, the lower courts’ prohibition of such
claims starkly departs from their approach toward parallel race and sex
discrimination litigation. Although a handful of courts initially
suggested that race and sex discrimination statutes might require a
terminated employee to prove that her employer replaced her with a
person of a different race or sex, this reading of Title VII and § 1981
was short-lived. In 1989, the Supreme Court made clear that replacing a
female employee with another female employee would not immunize an
employer from liability when gender stereotypes motivated the
employer’s termination decision.41 Similarly, in 1987, the Supreme
Court held that § 1981’s prohibition on race discrimination proscribes
racial discrimination between persons who are members of the same
race.42 This conclusion led lower courts to permit darker skinned
African Americans to allege racial discrimination when employers
discriminated against them in favor of lighter skinned African
Americans (and vice versa).43 Thus, by the late 1980s, courts
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249-51 (1989); see id. at 250 (“In the
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”).
42. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4, 613 (1987) (acknowledging
that “[c]lear-cut [racial] categories do not exist . . . [and] that racial classifications are for the
most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature,” the Court concluded that “a
distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection”). Unlike Title VII,
which prohibits national origin and color discrimination in addition to race discrimination,
§ 1981 only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(2006); 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
43. Curley v. St. John’s Univ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 181, 192−93 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[A] broad
body of precedent recognizes that intra-group discrimination exists, especially against those
with often-disfavored status within the group, such as the darkest-skinned among people of
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consistently held that evidence showing that an employer relied on the
plaintiff’s race- or gender-based characteristics in making an
employment decision alleviated any need for the plaintiff to identify a
comparator outside the plaintiff’s protected class.44
In light of courts’ readiness to permit intraclass claims for race and
sex discrimination litigation, courts’ reluctance to embrace intraclass
claims for disability discrimination litigation is counterintuitive. In
many ways it would seem that intraclass discrimination would be at
least as much of a problem in the disability context as in the race or
gender context. Just as employers may prefer employees whose race and
sex characteristics conform to majority norms, employers may prefer
persons whose disabilities are minor and elicit minimal negative
responses from co-workers. In addition to the manner in which
intraclass disability discrimination parallels race and sex discrimination,
intraclass disability discrimination also reflects the scope of intraclass
diversity, which is far more multifaceted for the ADA’s protected class
than for race or gender categories. Unlike the relatively uniform genetic
and phenotypic characteristics associated with specific races and
genders, the only common theme across the ADA’s protected class is
variation from the able-bodied norm. Accordingly, while it is often safe
to assume that an employer’s attitude toward one Hispanic employee
will be related to that employer’s attitude toward other Hispanic
employees, it is more difficult to assume that an employer’s attitude
toward a person with a physical disability like paraplegia is related to
that employer’s attitude toward a person with a mental illness like
bipolar disorder.45
color.”).
44. See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (“That one’s
replacement is of another race, sex, or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition.”); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995−96 (2d
Cir. 1985) (holding that a standard requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that he was replaced by a
person outside of his Title VII protected class was “inappropriate and at odds with the policies
underlying Title VII”); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting contention that “there can be no racial discrimination against a black person who is
not selected for a job when the person who is selected for the job is black”); Jones v. W.
Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that “proof that the
employer replaced the fired minority employee with a nonminority employee is not the only way
to create . . . an inference” of discrimination); cf. Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 486 (4th Cir.
2005) (“[E]very other circuit has held that a Title VII plaintiff does not always have to show
replacement outside the protected class in order to make out a prima facie case.”); id. at 488−89
(internal citation omitted) (noting “replacement within the protected class does not always give
rise to an inference of non-discrimination. One clear example of this is when the defendant hires
someone from within the plaintiff’s protected class in order ‘to disguise its act of discrimination
toward the plaintiff’. . . . [A]nother such category of cases is that wherein the firing and
replacement hiring decisions are made by different decisionmakers”).
45. The conclusion that the ADA only prohibits discrimination between persons with and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

442

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

B. The “Limited Protected Class” Rationale
In order to justify barring intraclass claims for ADA litigation while
allowing them for Title VII litigation, many courts stressed the limited
scope of the ADA’s protected class. They noted that unlike Title VII,
which prohibits race and sex discrimination against every employee of a
covered employer regardless of the employee’s race or sex, the ADA
prohibits disability discrimination only against members of the ADA’s
protected class.46 Focusing on the language that then defined the ADA’s
protected class—individuals who possess a disability that “substantially
limits one or more major life activities”47—courts concluded that the
ADA prohibited discrimination only between persons who fell within
that definition and those that fell without it.48 Based on this reasoning,
the D.C. Circuit concluded that the ADA permitted employers to
disfavor persons with specific disabilities “so long as [the employer] did
not distinguish between [a condition] that ‘substantially limit[ed] one or
more . . . major life activities’ and [a condition] that did not have such
an impact.”49
This analysis, of course, disregarded the history of disability-based
discrimination, which indicates that the animus directed by an employer
toward a person with a disability does not hinge solely—or often even
primarily—on whether the person’s impairment arises to the level of a
substantial limitation. Susan Stefan, an expert on mental disability
discrimination, has noted that “[t]he depth of discomfort caused by the
revelation that an individual has a mental illness is not related to any
perception that the individual is substantially limited in major life
activities.”50 Instead, Stefan explains, “[l]ike people who are HIVpositive or have AIDS, the degree to which people with mental illness
are limited in major life activities is largely irrelevant to the uneasiness

without disabilities also ignored the ADA’s “regarded as” provision, which permits individuals
who are not actually substantially limited in a major life activity to sue for disability
discrimination when their employer nonetheless takes adverse action against them on the basis
of a perceived disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2009). This section of the ADA strongly
suggests that the ADA is focused on addressing disability-based animus rather than on
providing a benefit based on the biological severity of the plaintiff’s disability.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
47. Id.
48. Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B)(i) (1994)).
49. Id. at 1061; see also id. at 1065 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[D]isparate
treatment . . . between physical impairment on the one hand and mental impairment on the
other . . . is permissible . . . because it is unrelated to disability, [which § 504 and the ADA
define] as a substantial limitation upon one or more of a person’s major life activities.”) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(i) (1994)) (emphasis added).
50. Stefan, supra note 7, at 273.
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and fear the conditions engender in others.”51 Because disabilityspecific animus is grounded more in discomfort and fear than in an
individual’s degree of limitation, a person substantially limited in one
major life activity, such as walking, may experience very different
social responses than a person substantially limited in another major life
activity, such as communicating. Nonetheless, many courts that
prohibited intraclass disability discrimination claims in the 1980s and
early 1990s appeared to infer from the limited nature of the ADA’s
protected class that, for purposes of discrimination claims, all members
of the protected class are identically situated.
C. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Erosion of
the “Limited Protected Class” Rationale
Many courts began to allow intraclass disability discrimination
claims after the Supreme Court held in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp.52 that intraclass claims were available under the ADEA,
the other federal employment discrimination statute with a limited
protected class.53 Resolving a case in which an employer replaced a 56year-old worker with a 40-year-old worker, both of whom were
members of the ADEA’s protected class, the O’Connor Court sided
with the many courts of appeal that had concluded that “[t]he fact that
one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the
protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his
age.”54 Reasoning that “the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of age and not class membership,” the Court explained that “[t]he
discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is discrimination ‘because of
[an] individual’s age,’ though the prohibition is ‘limited to individuals

51. Id. at 271–74.
52. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
53. The ADEA’s protected class consists of persons “at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (2006).
54. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996); see Roper v.
Peabody Coal Co., 47 F.3d 925, 926 (7th Cir. 1995); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d
724, 728 (3d Cir. 1995); Kralman v. Ill. Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 155 (7th Cir.
1994); Rinehart v. City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir. 1994); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1374 (2d Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Package
Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1334–35 (1st Cir. 1988); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l, 766 F.2d 788,
792 (3d Cir. 1985); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532–33 (9th Cir. 1981). But see
O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
Fourth Circuit cases required plaintiffs to show that their replacement was outside of the
protected class); La Pointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Sixth Circuit precedent requires replacement by someone outside of the protected
class); Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that a person
alleging “that he was unlawfully discharged because of age must demonstrate . . . [that] a person
outside the protected class replaced him”).
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who are at least 40 years of age.’”55
In O’Connor’s wake, many courts concluded that intraclass claims
were also available under the ADA.56 For example, the District Court
for the District of New Hampshire reasoned that because
the ADEA is violated by hiring a forty-five-year-old over
an otherwise qualified sixty-five-year-old based on
age . . . [i]t logically follows that the ADA is violated by a
policy that disadvantages schizophrenics based on their
disability, despite the fact that individuals confined to
wheelchairs are benefitted.57
Similarly, the District Court for the District of New Mexico reasoned
that just as

55. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312–13 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (citations omitted); 29
U.S.C. § 631(a)); see 517 U.S. at 312 (explaining that “[t]his language does not ban
discrimination against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination
against employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those who are 40 or
older”).
56. See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc. 191 F.3d 344, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In a
number of cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), we have expressed the fourth element of the
prima facie case in a manner that might appear to require proof of replacement by someone
outside of the relevant class . . . . But . . . we [have] rejected a defendant’s argument that an
ADEA plaintiff must prove that he or she was replaced by someone outside of the protected
class, a conclusion later ratified by O’Connor.”); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1185–86 n.11 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Given the somewhat unique characteristics of various
disabilities, and the differences between individuals afflicted with a particular disability,
replacement of one disabled individual with another disabled individual does not necessarily
weaken the inference of discrimination against the former individual. . . . We do not believe that
the plaintiff need necessarily establish that he or she was replaced by a person outside the
protected class as an element of his or her prima facie case.”).
57. Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (D.N.H. 1999); see also
Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 937 (N.D. Iowa 2000)
(“Nor does exclusion of all persons with a specified disability, whatever the degree, from
benefits provided to other disabled persons excuse discrimination by reason of that particular
disability. The Supreme Court recently, and emphatically, rejected such a contention in
Olmstead . . . . Thus, the County’s contention that there has been no discrimination by reason of
Salcido’s disability, dementia, when all persons with dementia are excluded from services,
cannot be sustained. Indeed, the County’s contention is as ludicrous as the suggestion that it
wouldn’t be discrimination ‘by reason of race’ if all black persons were excluded from public
services, but Asians and Hispanics were not excluded.”). Similarly, a pre-Olmstead district court
opinion which was reversed on appeal relied on O’Connor to conclude that the ADA permitted
intraclass claims. Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev’d,
180 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 1999). Based on O’Connor, the court concluded that “the ADA
must be construed to prohibit discrimination against individuals based on their specific
disability, and not merely to prohibit discrimination that negatively affects the disabled as a
class.” Id. at 1169.
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the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone
outside
the
protected
class
‘lacks
probative
value[,]’ . . . . the fact that [the defendant] may have hired a
blind or a deaf person, for example, lacks probative value
on the issue of whether [the plaintiff] was discriminated
against because of his disability.58
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court also
signaled that O’Connor’s reasoning applied to the ADA.59 Olmstead
involved two women with mental disabilities who argued that their
continued confinement in the psychiatric unit of a state hospital in
Georgia violated the ADA because state treatment professionals had
determined that they were eligible for a less restrictive placement in the
community.60 The plaintiffs’ argument relied on Department of Justice
regulations which concluded that the ADA prohibited “unjustified
placement or retention of persons in institutions, severely limiting their
exposure to the outside community.”61 The state countered this
argument by invoking the traditional bar on intraclass disability
discrimination claims.62 It argued that because the institution that
confined the plaintiffs only served persons with disabilities, the
plaintiffs could not prove disability discrimination.63 Sidestepping this
argument to focus on the ADA’s “findings and purposes” provisions
which suggested that unnecessary institutionalization could constitute
discrimination on the basis of disability, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs’ unjustified confinement violated the ADA.64 In response
to Justice Thomas’s dissent, which echoed the state’s contention that
disability discrimination claims required a comparator outside the
protected class,65 the majority cited O’Connor and explained that
58. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (D.N.M. 1998).
59. Olmstead v. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
60. Id. at 587–88.
61. Id. at 596 (citing 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998)).
62. L.C. ex. rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 896 (11th Cir. 1998).
63. Id. (arguing that “Title II of the ADA affords no protection to individuals with
disabilities who receive public services designed only for individuals with disabilities,” and that
the plaintiffs’ claims must fail because they had “not shown that they were denied community
placements available to non-disabled individuals because of disability”).
64. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (“[D]iscrimination
against the disabled persists in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization.”)). The majority
also explained that “[w]e are satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of the
concept of discrimination” in mind when it enacted the ADA. Id. at 598.
65. Id. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. (emphasizing that “community placement
simply is not available to those without disabilities”); id. at 622 (opining that the majority’s
conclusion that “it is sufficient to focus exclusively on members of one particular group” and
permissible to conclude that “discrimination [has] occur[red] when some members of a
protected group are treated differently from other members of that same group . . . is a
remarkable and novel proposition”).
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Justice Thomas’s “notion that . . . ‘a plaintiff cannot prove
“discrimination” by demonstrating that one member of a particular
protected group has been favored over another member of that same
group,’ . . . is incorrect as a matter of precedent and logic.”66
Despite the Court’s extension of O’Connor’s reasoning to ADA
claims, some lower courts still refused to embrace its application to
intraclass disability discrimination claims. For example, the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that the
argu[ment] that the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s decision in
Olmstead v. Zimring altered the legal landscape [and]
stands for the proposition that [an ADA plaintiff] can prove
discrimination by showing different treatment of two
members
of
the
same
class . . . is
not
compelling . . . [because] [d]isparate treatment of different
disabilities was not at issue [in Olmstead].67
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Maine rejected the
argument that “disparate treatment between different categories of
people within a protected class can amount to discrimination” because
the relevant portion of the Olmstead opinion “constitutes dicta” and
therefore “does not create new law to aid ADA claimants.”68 More
66. Id. at 598–99 n.10 (majority opinion) (citing O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996)). The Court further noted that, even if the ADA’s definition of
discrimination required reference to a comparison group,
[d]issimilar treatment . . . exists in this key respect: In order to receive needed
medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those
disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given
reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice.
Id. at 601; see also id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that if the plaintiffs “could
show that persons needing psychiatric or other medical services to treat a mental disability are
subject to a more onerous condition than are persons eligible for other existing state medical
services . . . then the beginnings of a discrimination case would be established”); id. at 612 (“[I]f
respondents could show that Georgia (i) provides treatment to individuals suffering from
medical problems of comparable seriousness, (ii) as a general matter, does so in the most
integrated setting appropriate for the treatment of those problems (taking medical and other
practical considerations into account), but (iii) without adequate justification, fails to do so for a
group of mentally disabled persons (treating them instead in separate, locked institutional
facilities) . . . it would demonstrate discrimination on the basis of mental disability.”).
67. Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D. Mass. 2000).
68. El-Hajj v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30, 31 (D. Me. 2001); see also
id. at 30–31 (“[S]everal courts specifically have found that Olmstead does not alter the validity
of the line of cases holding that an insurer does not transgress the ADA by treating mental and
physical disabilities differently.”); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104,
1117−18 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Applying Olmstead to insurance classifications would conflict with
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recently, the First Circuit, citing tension between Olmstead and an outof-circuit case which predated Olmstead, expressly declined to address
an argument that a Title II violation would “occur if a public entity
decided to make benefits available only to disabled individuals but then
proceeded to distribute those benefits only to those disabled people who
could access an administrative office on the second floor of a building
lacking wheelchair ramps or elevators.”69 Similarly, in 2008, the
Seventh Circuit opined, without discussing Olmstead, that courts must
dismiss ADA claims in which the plaintiff “cannot point to a single
similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated
more favorably.”70 Accordingly, despite the erosion of the limited
the Court’s decisions in Alexander v. Choate . . . and Traynor v. Turnage, . . . which both
endorse distinctions between types of disabilities . . . .”); Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper
Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 697−99 (D. Md. 2001) (“[B]ecause Dr. Freilich
has alleged only a difference in the way oversight and quality assurance is provided among
hospital patients (who are arguably all disabled), she fails to make the showing, as the statutes
require, that the treatment of the dialysis patients involves any difference in treatment between
the disabled and the non-disabled.”). But see Johnson v. KMart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1052−54
(11th Cir. 2001) reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated as moot, 273 F.3d at 1070 (11th Cir.
2001) (“Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead, a number of circuits had dismissed
cognate claims challenging mental-health caps based on the rationale that the ADA ‘prohibits
[only] discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled.’ . . . We conclude that these
cases are undercut by Olmstead. . . . Olmstead leads us to the conclusion that K Mart’s LTD
plan—which differentiates between individuals who are totally disabled due to a mental
disability and individuals who are totally disabled due to a physical disability because of the
given individual’s type of disability—appears prima facie to distinguish among beneficiaries on
a basis that constitutes a form of discrimination contravening Title I of the ADA.”); Fletcher v.
Tufts Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D. Mass 2005); Iwata v. Intel Corp. 349 F. Supp. 2d 135,
149 (D. Mass. 2004) (“This Court agrees with the Johnson court’s analysis of Olmstead. Title I
of the ADA prohibits discrimination amongst classes of the disabled.”); Hahn ex rel. Barta v.
Linn County, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1054–55 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (“[T]he court must first address
Discovery Living’s assertion that since it is a facility providing accommodations only to the
disabled, Mr. Hahn cannot demonstrate that he suffered from disparate treatment compared to
the non-disabled, as is required under Title III of the ADA. The Supreme Court recently, and
emphatically, rejected this assertion . . . in Olmstead . . . . Thus, Mr. Hahn can set forth a claim
of discrimination even if it is only between members of his protected class, namely, the
disabled.”); Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 937 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (“Nor does exclusion of all persons with a specified disability, whatever the degree, from
benefits provided to other disabled persons excuse discrimination by reason of that particular
disability. The Supreme Court recently, and emphatically, rejected such a contention . . . .”);
Boots v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (D.N.H. 1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has just rejected the argument that disparate treatment of different members of a protected class
is not discrimination.”).
69. Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 175 n.10 (1st Cir. 2006); see id. (explaining that
“[o]n this point, there is tension between [Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1998)] and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead”).
70. Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008). Relatedly, a larger number of
courts continue to categorically conclude that the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate does not
apply to employer-provided long-term disability plans or health insurance plans, even though
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protected class rationale for prohibiting intraclass claims, the current
scope of intraclass disability discrimination litigation remains unclear in
at least two circuits.
II. THE FUTURE SCOPE OF INTRACLASS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS
A. The Lingering “Collective Welfare” Rationale
Courts’ continued reluctance to permit intraclass disability
discrimination claims after O’Connor and Olmstead may stem, in part,
from a unique justification for prohibiting disability intraclass claims
that courts have never applied to age, sex, or race discrimination
statutes. Some courts have suggested that O’Connor’s reasoning, which
makes clear that a limited protected class in itself poses no bar to
intraclass discrimination claims, should not apply to the ADA because
the ADA, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, should maximize aggregate
benefits to its protected class.71 For example, in Modderno v. King,72 an
influential opinion issued three weeks after the Supreme Court’s
O’Connor opinion, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that § 504, the ADA’s
statutory predecessor, did not permit intraclass litigation because, in the
court’s view, such litigation could harm § 504’s protected class in the
aggregate.73 In Modderno, persons with mental disabilities challenged a
government employer’s health insurance plan that provided less
comprehensive coverage for healthcare costs associated with mental
disabilities than for comparable costs associated with physical
disabilities.74 The plan imposed a stringent lifetime cap on mental health
care expenses ($75,000) but no comparable cap on physical health care

the ADA’s text, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c), provides that insurance plans may differentiate amongst
disabilities only if the differentiation is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 152–53 (2d. Cir. 2000) (holding that the
ADA bars intraclass disability discrimination challenges to insurance plans); Parker v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co. 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (opining, in a case challenging an insurance
plan, that “the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities
[but instead] prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled”); EEOC v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the ADA permits long-term
disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental disabilities); Hess v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 99-384-P-C, 2000 WL 1186262, at *9 & n.7 (D. Me. Aug. 2, 2000) (holding that the
ADA permits long-term disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental
disabilities).
71. See, e.g., Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf. Lewis v. Kmart
Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[R]eliance on O’Connor simply does not make
intuitive sense.”).
72. 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
73. Id. at 1062.
74. Id. at 1060−61.
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expenses.75 After acknowledging that “[p]erhaps mentally disabled
individuals are more vulnerable to discrimination than the physically
disabled,” the D.C. Circuit concluded that § 504 should nonetheless
prohibit intraclass discrimination claims because “the disabled as a
class—mentally and physically disabled individuals in the aggregate—
are better off under [a plan that disadvantages persons with mental
disabilities] than under a plan in which mental and physical health
benefits are each subject to a lifetime limit of $75,000.”76 Assuming that
employers would respond to intraclass litigation by reducing the
benefits provided to currently-advantaged persons, the court explained
that “[w]e simply cannot believe that [§ 504,] a statute enacted for the
benefit of the disabled, produces this result” of disadvantaging
“disabled individuals in the aggregate.”77
In effect, the D.C. Circuit prioritized the preservation of employer
goodwill toward currently-advantaged persons with disabilities over the
elimination of discrimination against other persons with disabilities.78
This refusal to question why employers treat some members of § 504’s
protected class less favorably than others is in tension with § 504’s (and
the ADA’s) nondiscrimination mandate, which aims to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of disability. It also starkly contrasts with
the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of employers’ attempts to use
similar arguments under Title VII. Emphasizing that “[t]he principal
focus of [Title VII] is the protection of the individual employee, rather
than the protection of the minority group as a whole,” the Supreme
Court has consistently concluded that Title VII does not “give an
employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis
of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the
employees’ group.”79
75. Id. at 1060.
76. Id. at 1062. The court’s assumption that the government would simply treat currentlyadvantaged persons with disabilities worse in order to equalize the disparate treatment starkly
contrasts with the Equal Pay Act, which expressly prohibits employers from “cur[ing] the
disparity between male and female wage rates by lowering the male wage rate to the rate for
females.” EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir. 1992); see Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994) (“[A]n employer who is paying a wage rate differential in
violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the [nondiscrimination] provisions
of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.”); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974) (“The objective of equal pay legislation . . . is not to drag down men
workers to the wage levels of women, but to raise women to the levels enjoyed by men in cases
where discrimination is still practiced.”).
77. Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062.
78. The court ignored the fact that prohibiting intraclass claims would serve to isolate the
already marginalized employees with mental disabilities and further reduce their bargaining
power for better health coverage.
79. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–55 (1982); see also id. at 455–56 (“Title VII
does not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that he has not been
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wronged because other persons of his or her race or sex were hired. That answer is no more
satisfactory when it is given to victims of a policy that is facially neutral but practically
discriminatory. Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment
and practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”) (internal quotation
omitted); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1979) (“A racially balanced work
force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination. . . . It is
clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for
each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are
already proportionately represented in the work force.”); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (concluding that fairness to the class of women employees
as a whole could not justify unfairness to the individual female employee because “the statute’s
focus on the individual is unambiguous”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 341–42 (1977) (noting that an employer’s treatment of other members of the plaintiffs’
group can be “of little comfort to the victims of . . . discrimination”); Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–45 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that a rule barring employment of all
married women with preschool children, if not a bona fide occupational qualification under
§ 703(e), violated Title VII, even though female applicants without preschool children were
hired in sufficient numbers that they constituted 75% to 80% of the persons employed in the
position plaintiff sought).
Title VII case law also expressly conflicts with Modderno’s treatment of insurance plans
that prioritize some members of the ADA’s protected class over other class members. Title VII
case law indicates that just as insurance plans that provide more comprehensive coverage for
Caucasians than for African Americans violate Title VII, insurance plans that provide more
comprehensive coverage for the health care costs incurred by lighter skinned African Americans
than for darker skinned African Americans would violate Title VII. Cf. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983) (“[P]etitioner’s plan is
unlawful, because the protection it affords to married male employees is less comprehensive
than the protection it affords to married female employees.”); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that an employer violates Title VII if it
fails to meet the “special or increased healthcare needs associated with a woman’s unique sexbased characteristics . . . to the same extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare needs”);
see also U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LAWS & GUIDANCE: DECISION
ON COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decisioncontraception.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (concluding that an employer’s exclusion of
prescription contraceptives from a health plan that otherwise comprehensively covered
pharmaceuticals violates Title VII).
By contrast, the ADA’s text makes clear that insurance plans need not provide equally
comprehensive coverage to persons with disparate disabilities. Section 501 of the ADA, often
termed the “safe harbor provision,” permits employers to maintain insurance coverage
distinctions that produce unequal benefits to persons with different disabilities so long as the
distinctions are not a subterfuge for disability discrimination, a standard that the EEOC has
translated to simply require that the coverage distinctions be “actuarially justified.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(c) (2006); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, DIRECTIVES
TRASNMITTAL:
EEOC
COMPLIANCE
MANUAL
(2000),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/benefits.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009); see Mary Crossley,
Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L REV. 73, 93−94 (2005)
(“The thinness of this protection stands in marked contrast to the substantial protection provided
by Title VII’s prohibition of race- and sex-based distinctions in employer-provided coverage
regardless of any actuarial justification.”); Sharona Hoffman, Aids Caps, Contraceptive
Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes’ Applicability
to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2002) (concluding that § 501(c) “allows
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Although in recent years, the discussion surrounding intraclass
discrimination claims has focused largely on the O’Connor Court’s
interpretation of the ADEA’s limited protected class rather than
Modderno’s “aggregate benefits” analysis, many courts—both before
and after O’Connor—have, in keeping with Modderno, assumed that
while intraclass claims are available under Title VII and the ADEA,
they are not available under the ADA.80 Perhaps these courts’ unstated
rationale parallels the Modderno’s Court’s rationale: Disallowing
intraclass disability discrimination claims will maximize collective
benefits to the ADA’s protected class. Moreover, courts may implicitly
assume that employers will be more receptive to hiring members of the
ADA’s protected class when they know that courts will not evaluate
their decisions to choose amongst members of the ADA’s protected
class. Even though most employer decisions that require choosing
amongst people with different disabilities will not violate the ADA,
employers might prefer to know that all such choices—even those
motivated by animus toward particular types of disabilities—will not
trigger ADA scrutiny.
While a higher employment level for the ADA’s protected class is
obviously a laudable goal, Modderno’s aggregate benefits reasoning
reflects a welfare-based model of disability policy that is in tension with
the civil rights rhetoric that surrounded the passage of the ADA.81 By
employers to retain discriminatory insurance terms if they can prove a basis for them in sound
actuarial principles”). While the safe harbor provision did not apply to the insurance plan the
Modderno opinion discussed, many other opinions categorically held that the ADA bars
intraclass claims, and did not acknowledge the safe harbor provision and its potential
applicability to the case at hand. These courts bypassed § 501 to hold more broadly that the
ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate encompasses no intraclass claims, an odd conclusion since
§ 501 appears to be a special exception to the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate that Congress
adopted as a concession to the insurance industry. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank,
207 F.3d 144, 147 n.3 (2d. Cir. 2000) (concluding that the ADA does not encompass intraclass
claims to long–term disability plans even though the plaintiff had argued that the specific plan at
issue fell within the ADA’s safe harbor provision); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. 121 F.3d
1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to discuss the ADA’s safe harbor provision and deciding
that “[t]he ADA simply does not mandate equality between individuals with different
disabilities [but instead it] prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled”);
EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to discuss the ADA’s
safe harbor provision and concluding that the ADA permits long–term disability plans to
differentiate between physical and mental disabilities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99-384-PC., 2000 WL 1186262, at *9 n.7 (D. Me. 2000) (holding that the ADA permits long–term
disability plans to differentiate between physical and mental disabilities while explicitly
declining to “reach the alternative arguments of MetLife and Allstate that . . . the Plan falls
within the ADA safe harbor”).
80. See supra note 19 and cases cited therein.
81. The ADA was enacted amidst fanfare characterizing the statute as “a civil rights act
for people with disabilities.” 135 CONG. REC. S4984, at S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Lieberman). The Senators who introduced the ADA in 1989 expressly
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accepting, rather than challenging, employers’ tendency to disfavor
persons with certain disabilities, Modderno’s emphasis on the aggregate
welfare of the ADA’s protected class limits the ADA’s capacity to
address disability-based animus and to protect individual rights. It also
undercuts the ADA’s standing as a civil rights statute that parallels Title
VII.
B. Intraclass Claims by Persons Whose Disabilities Are Less
Severe
The welfare-based framework that Modderno and other courts have
used to disallow intraclass disability discrimination claims also
influences the many courts that permit such claims. To date, the courts
permitting intraclass discrimination claims have done so primarily in
situations in which a plaintiff alleges that he suffered discrimination
because his disability is more biologically severe than the disabilities of
individuals who received superior treatment. This practice suggests that
some courts may continue to regard the ADA’s primary goal as
improving the aggregate welfare of people with disabilities rather than
eliminating disability discrimination.82
invoked the memory of the Civil Rights Act, describing persons with disabilities as a
“minority” that has experienced discrimination and segregation analogous to that
experienced by African Americans. Senator Kennedy championed the ADA as a design to
“end this American apartheid.” 101 CONG. REC. S4979 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy); see also 101 CONG. REC. S4979 at 8507–14 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy and Sen. Harkin).
82. See Wagner by Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1016 n.15 (3d Cir.
1995) (“[A] program barring all severely retarded persons from a program available to mildly
retarded persons may be discriminatory.”); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 916 F. Supp.
133, 140–42 (D. Conn. 1996) (noting that “under both statutes [the ADA and § 504], [covered
entities are] prohibited from refusing to consider certain residents for possible community
placement, merely based upon the degree of their disabilities”); Homeward Bound v. Hissom,
No. 85-C-437, 1987 WL 27104, at *20–21 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987) (indicating that
discrimination against persons whose disabilities are more severe violates § 504); Klostermann
v. Cuomo, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that it would violate § 504 to treat
mentally ill persons differently with respect to the provision of services based on the severity of
their mental illnesses); cf. Plummer by Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 578 (8th Cir.1984)
(“[W]e assume [without deciding] that the severity of the plaintiffs’ handicaps is itself a
handicap which, under section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, cannot be the sole reason for
[adverse treatment].”); Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268, 1278–81 (D. Conn. 1981)
(suggesting obliquely that severity qualifies as a disability under § 504); see also Messier, 916
F. Supp. at 141 (“[N]umerous courts have recognized that both Section 504 and the ADA
prohibit discrimination on the basis of the severity of a person’s disability.”); Jackson by
Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1298–99 (D.N.M. 1990),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that “[t]he severity of
plaintiffs’ handicaps is itself a handicap,” such that “failure to accommodate the severely
handicapped . . . while serving [their] less severely handicapped peers is unreasonable and
discriminatory.”); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 214–15 (D.N.H. 1981) (“[T]he spirit of
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The post-O’Connor ADEA case law has encouraged this trend.
Since O’Connor, which prompted many courts to conclude that the
ADA permits intraclass claims, the Supreme Court has clarified that the
scope of intraclasss age discrimination claims only encompasses claims
by older workers challenging preferences for comparatively younger
workers. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,83 the Court
held that although, read literally, the ADEA appears to bar all agemotivated employment decisions, this prohibition actually extends only
to employment decisions that disadvantage older workers vis-à-vis
comparatively younger workers.84 In other words, a forty-five year-old
has no ADEA claim when an employer decides, based on age, to
replace him with a fifty-five year-old. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court noted that the word “age,” unlike the word “race,” clearly
suggests a one-way continuum, such that “discrimination on the basis of
age” does not encompass all forms of age-based decision-making.85 The
Court also emphasized the ADEA’s limited protected class, reasoning
that “[i]f Congress had been worrying about protecting the younger
against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under
forty.”86
This reasoning appears to have led some courts to conclude that
Congress similarly did not intend to protect members of the ADA’s
protected class with less biologically severe disabilities from
employers’ decisions to favor persons whose disabilities are more
biologically severe. For example, in an opinion issued soon after
O’Connor, the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa
concluded that the ADA requires a plaintiff to show that he or she “was
the law is violated when certain [persons with disabilities] are afforded qualitatively different
and better facilities than their more profoundly handicapped peers.”); Goebel v. Colo. Dep’t of
Insts., 764 P.2d 785, 804 (Colo. 1988) (“[T]he failure to provide the more severely disabled
persons access to services constitutes discrimination solely on the basis of particular handicaps,
in violation of section 504.”). But see Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 692–96 (D.C. Pa. 1985)
(suggesting that the severity analysis should apply in both directions).
83. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
84. Id. at 598 (“[T]he prohibition of age discrimination is readily read more narrowly than
analogous provisions dealing with race and sex. That narrower reading is the more natural one
in the textual setting, and it makes perfect sense because of Congress’s demonstrated concern
with distinctions that hurt older people.”); see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be
unlawful for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”) (emphasis added); id. § 631(a)
(“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of
age.”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 540 U.S. at 590–91 (“[T]he ADEA was concerned to
protect a relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage of the relatively
young.”).
85. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 540 U.S. 581, 598,
86. Id. at 591.
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replaced by a non-disabled person, one with a lesser disability, or one
whose disability is more easily accommodated.”87
Limiting intraclass claims in this manner, however, threatens to
exempt some disability-motivated employment decisions from the
ADA’s reach. While the replacement of a person with a disability by “a
non-disabled person, one with a lesser disability, or one whose
disability is more easily accommodated,”88 may often be good evidence
of disability discrimination, replacement by a person with a greater
disability or a disability that requires more costly accommodation
should not necessarily prevent a terminated employee from
demonstrating that disability-specific animus influenced his employer’s
decision. Unlike age, which operates on a linear continuum, the term
“disability” is far more variegated. Although disability-related welfare
policies often regard disability as involving a severity-based continuum,
sociological studies demonstrate that the social stigma and stereotypes
surrounding various disabilities often do not correlate with biological
severity.89 Mental disabilities, for example, often carry a far greater
social stigma than physical disabilities, even when compared to physical
disabilities that are more biologically severe and more costly to
accommodate.90
C. Intraclass Claims and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The ADAAA’s expansion of the ADA’s protected class underscores
the ADA’s focus on addressing socially-imposed obstacles to persons
with disabilities. Unlike the ADA’s original text, which limited the
ADA’s protected class to persons substantially limited in a major life
activity, the ADA now extends protected class status to all persons who
possess a physical or mental impairment that is not minor or
transitory.91 This change indicates that the ADA aims to prohibit all
87. Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 394–95 (N.D. Iowa 1995);
see id. (“[O]r, [in the alternative, that] the plaintiff was treated less favorably than non-disabled
employees, those with lesser disabilities, or those whose disabilities are more easily
accommodated.”); id. at 395 (“A plaintiff has been terminated ‘because of’ his or her disability
just as surely where the employer terminates the plaintiff in favor of another who also fits within
the ADA’s definition of ‘disabled,’ but whose disability is more cheaply or easily
accommodated, as when the plaintiff is terminated in favor of an non-disabled person.”); see
also Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1408–11 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Fink v. Kitzman,
881 F. Supp. 1347, 1374–76 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
88. Hutchinson, 883 F. Supp. at 394–95.
89. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 273−74.
90. Id. at 272.
91. The ADA’s original text provided that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual on the basis of
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). It defined disability as “a physical or mental
impairment” that “substantially limits” one or more of an individual’s “major life activities.” Id.
§ 12102(1)(A). The amendments, by contrast, provide more simply that “[n]o covered entity
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forms of disability-based discrimination rather than to encourage
preferences for persons whose disabilities are more biologically
severe.92 Similarly, the amendments’ reinvigoration of the ADA’s
“regarded as” provision, which permits individuals who do not have a
physical or mental impairment to sue for disability discrimination when
their employer takes adverse action against them on the basis of a
perceived disability, strongly suggests that the ADA is focused on
addressing disability-based animus rather than on providing a benefit
based on the biological severity of the plaintiff’s disability.93
The fact remains, however, that in addition to reducing the textual
justifications for prohibiting intraclass disability discrimination claims,
the ADAAA also makes such claims more likely. By bringing a broader
range of individuals into the ADA’s protected class, the amendments
will likely increase allegations that an employer refused to hire a
plaintiff because of his disability and instead hired another member of
the ADA’s protected class.94
The manner in which courts deal with these claims will reveal a
great deal about the extent to which courts have abandoned the welfare
model of disability policy in favor of the civil rights model that aligns
the ADA with Title VII. Courts adhering to a welfare model might point
to the amendments’ codification of ADA case law which concludes that
the ADA does not permit “reverse discrimination” suits by persons
without disabilities claiming an employer treated them less favorably
than disabled persons and thus “subject[ed them] to discrimination

shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). However, the amendments
further provide that a plaintiff who sues for a reasonable accommodation must still demonstrate
a substantial limitation of a major life activity. Id. § 4(a).
92. In fact, the ADAAA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the
amendments to bring into the ADA’s protected class many individuals with stigmatizing
disabilities that are not necessarily the most biologically severe disabilities. The legislative
history indicates that Congress was concerned that the ADA’s protected class encompass
persons with disabilities that continue to carry a large social stigma—such as epilepsy, bipolar
disorder, and depression—that may lead to disability discrimination in employment even though
case law suggests that courts have not regarded them as severe, due to the availability of
medication. H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 20 (2008).
93. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, at § 4(a).
94. Although the ADAAA codifies judicial conclusions that the ADA does not permit
“reverse discrimination” suits by persons who claim that they were “subject to discrimination
because of [their] lack of disability,” the ADAAA says nothing about whether persons who fall
within the ADA’s protected class can challenge employers’ decisions to disadvantage them
because of their relatively less severe disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, at § 6(a); see
also H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill prohibits reverse discrimination
claims by disallowing claims based on the lack of disability (e.g., a claim by someone without a
disability that someone with a disability was treated more favorably by, for example, being
granted a reasonable accommodation or modification to services or programs).”).
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because of [their] lack of disability.”95 Courts might use this prohibition
on reverse discrimination claims to reason that the ADA, like the
ADEA, is only concerned about discrimination on a linear continuum.
Courts should resist this impulse. Congress’ choice to prohibit
“reverse discrimination” claims does not indicate that Congress
intended to restrict the claims that members of the ADA’s protected
class may bring against their employers. Similarly, Congress’ initial
choice to limit the right to sue under the ADA to persons “substantially
limited in a major life activity” does not indicate that Congress was
concerned only about discrimination that disadvantages persons with
more medically severe disabilities vis-à-vis persons whose disabilities
are less medically severe. Instead, the ADA’s text indicates that
Congress was concerned with “restrictions and limitations,” “unequal
treatment,” and “stereotypic assumptions,”96—in other words, socially
imposed difficulties that do not always strictly correlate with the
medical severity of a disability.97
CONCLUSION
Due to the variegated nature of stereotypes and myths about different
disabilities, the ADA should permit intraclass disability discrimination
claims. While social welfare plans—such as Social Security Disability
Insurance or even congressionally-crafted affirmative action plans—
might reasonably prioritize benefit allocations to individuals whose
disabilities are more biologically severe, the ADA should not enshrine a
similar preference for biological severity in employment. Such an
emphasis on biological severity would inappropriately obscure the
negative social responses to disability that do not necessarily correlate
with a disability’s biological severity.

95. The ADAAA provides that “[n]othing in [the ADA] shall provide the basis for a claim
by an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because of
the individual’s lack of disability.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, at § 6(a); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill prohibits reverse discrimination claims by
disallowing claims based on the lack of disability. . . .”). Even before the ADAAA codified the
ADA’s prohibition of reverse discrimination suits, the ADA’s limited protected class made this
conclusion easy to reach as a textual matter because unlike Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” the ADA prohibited
disability discrimination only against “individual[s] with a disability.” 42. U.S.C. 12112(a)
(2006). But see Woods v. Phoenix Soc’y of Cuyahoga County, No. 76286, 2000 WL 640566, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 18, 2000) (permitting a reverse discrimination suit to proceed).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006).
97. Id.
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